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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WHAT CONSTITUTES SEIZURE-The

conduct

of police officers in accelerating a marked patrol car to catch up
with a pedestrian and driving alongside the running pedestrian is
not sufficient to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the
Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.-,

108 S.Ct. 1975, (1988).

While on patrol in a marked police car, police officers observed a
man approach Michael Mose Chesternut.' Upon seeing the patrol
car approach the corner where he was standing, Chesternut began
to run.2 The patrol car accelerated in order to catch up with him
and then drove alongside him for a short distance. 3 As the officers
were driving alongside him, they observed him discard a number of
packets that were in his possession.' One of the officers got out of
the car and examined the packets Chesternut had discarded.5 The
packets contained pills which one officer believed to be narcotics.'
Chesternut was arrested and taken to the police station where he
was searched.7 The search revealed that he had in his possession
another packet containing pills, heroin and a hypodermic needle.8
Chesternut was charged with violating Michigan's controlled substance statute.' At a hearing before a magistrate, Chesternut
1. Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1977 (1988), (hereinafter cited as Chesternut). Four police officers were engaged in a routine patrol in metropolitan Detroit. Chesternut had been standing alone on the corner of an intersection when a car pulled over to
the curb, and a man got out of the car and approached Chesternut. Id.
2. Id. at 1977.
3. Id. One of the officers testified that the purpose of following Chesternut around
the corner and driving alongside him was for the officers "to see where he was going."Id.
4. Id. Chesternut was pulling packets of pills out of his pockets and throwing them
to the ground. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Officer Peltier based his belief on experience he had gained from being a
paramedic. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. MICH. COMe. LAWS § 333.7403 (1980)(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(7403)(Callaghan 1988)) entitled "Controlled substance; possession; prescription or order of practitioner" provides:
(1) A person shall not knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of the practitioner's professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this article. [Same; violation; penalty;
schedule 1-5 substances.] (2) A person who violates this section as to:
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moved for dismissal of the charges relying on People v. Terrell.10
"The examining magistrate and the trial court suppressed the evidence seized . . . finding that because the police admittedly had
not seen the defendant do anything wrong, it was illegal to pursue
him."11 The Michigan Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision,
took the position that " as soon as the officers began their pursuit,
[Chesternut's] freedom was restricted."' 2 Relying on state law
promulgated in People v. Terrell 3 and People v. Shabaz,4 the
(a) A controlled substance classified in schedule 1 or 2 which is either a narcotic drug or described in section 7214(a)(iv), and;
(i) Which is in an amount of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for life.
(ii) Which is in an amount of 225 grams or more, but less than 650
grams, of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and
shall be imprisoned for not less than 20 years nor more than 30 years.
(iii) Which is in an amount of 50 grams or more, but less than 225
grams, of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and
shall be either imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20
years or placed on probation for life.
(iv) Which is in an amount of less than 50 grams of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 4 years, or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or
both.
(b) A controlled substance classified in schedule 1, 2, 3, or 4, except a controlled substance classified in schedule 1 for which a penalty is prescribed in
subdivision (a),(c),or (d), is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for
not more than 2 years, or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
10. People v. Terrell, 77 Mich. App. 676, 678, 259 N.W.2d 187, 188 (1977)(hereinafter
cited as Terrell). According to the arresting officer,after Terrell saw the police officer, Terrell reached into his pocket and ran into an apartment building. The police officer followed
Terrell into the building and observed Terrell "drop a clear coin envelope containing a
brown powdery substance." The officer picked up the envelope and arrested Terrell on suspicion of possession of heroin. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the envelope and its contents. The
Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant's actions were not sufficient to arouse
the suspicion of the officer; and therefore, the officers seizure of the evidence was not justified. Id. at 679-80, 259 N.W.2d at 188-89.
11. Michigan v. Chesternut, 157 Mich. App. 181, 403 N.W.2d 74, 75 (1986).
12. Id.
13. 77 Mich App. 676, 259 N.W.2d 187 (1977).
14. Id. at 75-6. In rendering its decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on
People v. Terrell, supra, and People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985), cert.
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986). In Shabaz, the defendant was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. Police officers observed defendant carrying a brown, paper bag. When the
police officers slowed their car alongside the defendant, the defendant ran and the officers
gave chase. During the chase, the officers observed the defendant enter a doorway and come
back out without the bag. The officers retrieved the bag, discovered the weapon and arrested the defendant. 378 N.W.2d at 453. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the pursuit itself constituted seizure of the defendant. Id. at 462. The Court held that, by itself,
Shabaz's flight from the police officers was not sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion by
the police, and thus, the seizure was not valid. Id. at 460.
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Michigan Court of Appeals held that the police must have an objective, particularized suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal conduct. The court held, therefore, that the fact the defendant
ran was not sufficient, standing by itself, to raise such a suspicion. 5 The court reasoned that since the police did not observe
Chesternut engaging in criminal conduct, nor in any suspicious activity other than his flight, the officers were not justified in seizing
him."6 Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in suppressing the evidence obtained in the illegal
17
seizure and thus "reluctantly affirmed" the trial court's ruling.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider whether the officers' pursuit of [Chesternut] constituted a
seizure implicating Fourth Amendment protections .. ."18 Michigan argued that until the police actually apprehend the individual,
the Fourth Amendment is not to be considered at all.1 9 Chesternut,
on the other hand, urged that in the event that the police lack a
particularized and objective suspicion that the individual in question may be engaged in criminal activity, any police "chase" implicates the Fourth Amendment.2 0 The Court, however, chose to disregard both of these arguments.2 The Supreme Court chose
instead to apply a rule of law that the Court had used in previous
cases.2" Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court and
noted that the applicable test as to whether an individual has been
seized by the police for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is "if,
in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."2
The Supreme Court admits that this test is imprecise;24 but according to the Court, the objective nature of this test, enables the
15. Chesternut, 157 Mich. App. 181, 403 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1986).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1978.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1979.
22. Id. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
23. Id. at 1979 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
24. Id. The Court concludes the Mendenhall test is imprecise
because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of the police conduct, taken as a
whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is
not "free" to leave will vary.
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police to determine whether their conduct will violate the Fourth
Amendment before they actually conduct themselves in the manner in which they are considering.2 5
The Supreme Court, in applying this test to the facts of Chesternut's case, concluded that a reasonable person would not have
reached the conclusion that he was in the custody of the police
when the patrol car accelerated and drove alongside him."' In
reaching this conclusion the United States Supreme Court relied
on previous cases in which they held that police presence in the
form of surveillance27 or in the form of a police officer approaching
an individual28 did not necessarily constitute a seizure. Thus, according to the Court, because a reasonable person would not have
believed he was seized, "[t]he police therefore were not required to
have 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Chesternut] of criminal activity' in order to pursue him. ' 29 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration."
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia concurred in a separate
opinion.3s Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia saw this case as an
opportunity to declare that on matters such as these, the rule of
law is that until a police officer's conduct succeeds in restraining a
person, Fourth Amendment protections concerning seizures are not
implicated.32
25. Id. The Court reached this conclusion by considering the objective nature of the
test itself, citing 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(h), at 407-08 (2d. ed. 1987). The
Court reasoned that the police will be able to consider their actions in the context of how a
reasonable person would likely interpret those actions, that is, as to whether a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave. The Court, however, did stress that, in
spite of the fact that the test is imprecise, the test was to be applied in a consistent manner
from one police encounter to the next. Id.
26. Id. at 1981. The Court noted that the presence of a police car driving alongside a
person may be intimidating but, according to the Court, an intimidating situation alone
does not constitute a seizure. Id.
27. Id. at 1980. See, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
28. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1981. See, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 (1983).
29. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1981. As authority for this conclusion, the Supreme
Court cited United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
30. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1981.
31. Id.
32. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote,
It is at least plausible to say that whether or not the officers' conduct communicates
to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does
not implicate Fourth Amendment protections unless it achieves a restraining effect.
The Court's opinion does not foreclose this holding, and I concur.
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The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio3s promulgated the concept that the Fourth Amendment governs seizures of
the person in instances other than arrest."' In Terry, a detective,
McFadden, observed two strangers on a street corner whom he believed to be acting suspiciously.3 5 Suspecting that the men were
planning a robbery he approached them, identified himself as a policeman, and asked them their names.36 The men "mumbled something" so McFadden spun Terry around, frisked him, discovered a
gun in Terry's possession and arrested him. 7 Terry was charged
with and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon." The Ohio
Court of Appeals affirmed and the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal on the grounds that there was "no substantial constitutional question" involved.3 9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.'0
The Supreme Court concluded that McFadden had seized Terry
when he took hold of him and patted him down .4 The Court held
that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. "42 The Court
expanded upon this by saying that "only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure'
3
has occurred.'
The Court held that in justifying a particular search and seizure,
an officer must be able to point to particular facts which would
warrant the search and seizure. 4 4 In assessing whether the particular facts did indeed warrant a seizure, an objective standard must
be used in which the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure are scrutinized to determine whether a man of reasonable caution would believe the action taken to be appropriate.'6 The
Court held, additionally, that the reasonableness of the search
must weigh the need to search or seize, which is the governmental
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

392 U.S. 1 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Terry).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
387 U.S. 929 (1967).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19, n.16.
Id. at 21.
Id at 21-22.
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interest, against the invasion which the search or seizure entails,
which is the constitutionally protected interests of the citizen."6
In United States v. Mendenhall,7 two federal agents from the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) observed Mendenhall when she
arrived at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. Believing her conduct to
be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics,4 8 the
agents approached her, identified themselves as federal agents, and
asked to see her identification and airline ticket.49 The ticket and
the identification were in two different names. The agents returned
her ticket and driver's license and asked her if she would accompany them to the DEA office, to which she consented.50 Once in
the office, Mendenhall consented to a request by the agents for
permission to search her person and handbag.51 The search revealed that she had in her possession packets of heroin. Mendenhall motioned to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, but
the Eastern District Court of Michigan denied the motion. The
District Court concluded that the initial stop of Mendenhall was a
permissible investigative stop and that the subsequent search was
voluntarily consented to by Mendenhall. 2 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Mendenhall had not
validly consented to the search. 3
The Supreme Court in Mendenhall embraced the Terry holding
that a person is "seized" only when his freedom of movement is
restrained by means of physical force or show of authority.5 According to Mendenhall, Fourth Amendment protections are in46. Id. at 21. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967).
47. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
48. Id. at 544, 547, n.1. The agents based their belief on the so called "drug courier
profile" which is an abstract of characteristics which are thought to be typical of persons
transporting illegal drugs.
In this case, the agents thought it relevant that 1.) [Mendenhall] was arriving on a
flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be the place of origin for
much of the heroin brought to Detroit; 2.) [Mendenhall] was the last person to leave
the plane; 'appeared to be very nervous' and 'completely scanned the whole area
where [the agents] were standing;' 3.) after leaving the plane [Mendenhall] proceeded
past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and 4.) [Mendenhall] changed
airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id.
49. Id. at 544.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 545.
54. Id. at 553.
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voked only when restraint is imposed on the defendant.5 In fact,
the Court concluded that "a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." 56 The Court added
that the subjective intent of the DEA agent is irrelevant except
57
insofar as that intent may have been conveyed to the defendant.
The Court reasoned that Mendenhall had not been seized by the
agents simply because they had approached her, asked her to show
them her ticket and identification and asked her several questions. 8 Rather, "as long as the person to whom the questions are
put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there
has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty . . . as would
under the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification." 59 In the absence of evidence indicating that a person's freedom of movement was restricted, e.g., a threatening presence of officers or a display of weapons by an officer, 0 contact between an officer and a member of the public does not constitute a
seizure by the police."'
In Florida v. Royer,6" two detectives observing Royer in Miami
International Airport believed that his characteristics fit a "drug
courier profile."6 The detectives approached Royer, identified
themselves as detectives, and asked to speak to him." The detectives asked to see his airline ticket and identification. Royer produced the requested materials but did not give oral consent to the
55. Id.
56. 446 U.S. at 554.
57. Id. at 554, n.6.
58. Id. at 555.
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 555.
62. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
63. Id. at 493, n. 2. As in Mendenhall, the agents used the so-called "drug courier
profile." In Royer's case, Royer's actions at the airport drew the attention of several detectives. The detectives considered the following facts to be within the "drug courier profile":
(a) Royer was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be heavy, (b)
he was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casually dressed, (d) he appeared
pale and nervous, looking around at other people, (e) he paid for his ticket in cash
with a number of large bills, and (f)rather than completing the airline identification
tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a name, address, and
telephone number, he wrote only a name and the destination.
Id.
64. Id. at 494.
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detectives request." Noticing a discrepancy in the names on the
ticket and the driver's license, the detectives questioned Royer
about the discrepancy, informed him that they were narcotics investigators and told him they suspected him of transporting narcotics. 68 Without returning his ticket or identification, the detectives asked Royer to accompany them to a room." Royer did not
respond but did accompany the detectives. Without his consent,
the detectives retrieved his luggage and brought it to the room. 8
Royer did not respond orally to the detectives' request to search
the luggage, however he did unlock one of the suitcases which was
found to contain marihuana."9 Royer also did not object to the
detectives prying open a second suitcase in which they also found
marihuana.7 0
The trial court denied Royer's motion to suppress evidence, and
Royer was convicted for felony possession of marihuana. 71 The
Florida District Court of Appeals reversed Royer's conviction holding that "Royer had been involuntarily confined within the small
room without probable cause [and that] the involuntary detention
had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v.

Ohio....

172

The United States Supreme Court held that although it was permissible for the detectives to ask for and examine Royer's ticket
and driver's license, the detectives had seized Royer, for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, when they identified themselves as narcotics agents, informed Royer of their suspicion that he was transporting narcotics, requested Royer to accompany them to the police room and did not return his driver's license and ticket.7 3 The
Court reasoned that these actions by the detectives constituted "a
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The detectives later described this room as a "large storage closet" located in
the stewardess lounge (a private area not necessarily accessible to the general public). Justice Powell in his concurring opinion considered the fact that Royer was taken to a private
area and placed in a small windowless room with two officers who had retained Royer's
driver's license and airline ticket as being significant and as distinguishing this case from
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Justice Powell concluded that Royer was
not free to leave the room, and that the subsequent search was not consensual and therefore
illegal. Id. at 508-09.
68. Id. at 494.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 495. It was necessary for the detectives to pry open the suitcase because
Royer had forgotten the combination to the suitcase. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 501.
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show of authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' "I" According to the Court,
the seizure could have been avoided by returning to Royer his
ticket and driver's license and informing him that he was free to
go. At that point, if he had stayed, it would have been consensual. 75 In affirming the Florida District Court of Appeals, the
United States Supreme Court went on to point out that there is no
"litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from
a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of
on the
an investigative stop. . . .' The encounter must be judged
7
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the event. 1
8
In Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Delgado,7 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents, acting pursuant
to warrants and consent by factory owners, conducted "factory
surveys" in search of illegal aliens. 79 During the course of the
surveys, INS agents positioned themselves at the factory exits
while other agents moved about the work force, identified themselves as INS agents and questioned employees about their citizenship." During the survey, employees were free to continue their
work and walk about the factory.8 1 Employees of Southern California Davis Pleating Co. and their union, the International Ladies
'1

74. Id. at 502.
75. Id. at 504-05. The Court also looked at the fact that the reason the detectives had
moved the questioning to a private room had been to discover the contents of his luggage
rather than for safety reasons. According to the Court there were no facts in the record,
which would support a finding that the legitimate law enforcement purposes which
justified the detention in the first instance were furthered by removing Royer to the
police room prior to the officers' attempt to gain his consent to a search of his luggage. . . .[Hiad Royer consented to a search on the spot, the search could have been
conducted with Royer present in the area where the bags were retrieved by [the
detectives] and any evidence recovered would have been admissible against him. If
the search proved negative, Royer would have been free to go much earlier and with
less likelihood of missing his flight...
Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 506-07.
77. Id. The Court held that,
[elven in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless variations
in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts
can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers
to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
78. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 213.
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Garment Workers' Union, filed suit alleging that the surveys violated their Fourth Amendment rights.8 2 The United States District
Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the INS, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. 8 3 The Court of Appeals agreed with the employees' contention that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the factory
surveys constituted a seizure of the entire work force. 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.8 5 The Supreme Court rejected the employees' and union's contention that the entire work
forces of the factories were seized during the surveys.86 The Court
reasoned that the INS agents did not restrict the workers' freedom
of movement in the factories because, during working hours, employees are already restricted in their freedom of movement at the
87
work place.
The employees and their union further argued that the presence
of the INS agents at the exits showed the INS' intent to prevent
the workers from leaving the building.88 The United States Supreme Court disposed of this argument by stating that the purpose
of placing the agents at the exits was to insure that all the workers
were questioned. 9 The agents questioned workers regarding their
citizenship and arrested only those believed to be in the country
unlawfullyY0 According to the Court, any worker who was lawfully
in the country would not have a reasonable fear of being detained
by the agents at the exits or in the factory.9 1 In keeping with this
line of reasoning, the Supreme Court dismissed as "ambiguous and
isolated" an incident in which an INS agent posted at an exit attempted to prevent a worker from leaving the premises during the
survey.92 The Court went on to hold that, in light of the fact that
the agents were positioned at the exits in order to question employees, most employees could not have reasonably been in fear of
82. Id. All of the employees who filed the suit were in the United States legally. Id.
83. Id. at 214.
84. Id. at 210, 214.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id. at 218.
87. Id. The Court also pointed out that the workers were permitted to continue going
about their ordinary business. Id.
88. Id.
* 89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 218-19.
92. Id. at 218, n.6.
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being detained; and thus, the work force as a whole was not
seized. 3
The holding of the United States Supreme Court that the encounter between Chesternut and the police did not amount to a
seizure is consistent with its holdings in cases subsequent to Terry.
In these cases there has been a narrowing of what constitutes a
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.9 ' In determining
whether an encounter between the police and a citizen amounts to
a seizure, the United States Supreme Court has utilized the test
that it promulgated in Mendenhall 5 In Royer, the Supreme Court
refined the Mendenhall test somewhat by declaring that a person
is seized where there has been "a show of authority such that 'a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.' ,e The Supreme Court in Chesternut held that a reasonable person would not have reached the conclusion that he was in
the custody of the police when the patrol car accelerated and drove
alongside him.9 7 The holdings of the Supreme Court in Chesternut
and in cases involving Fourth Amendment seizures subsequent to
Terry9" raise the question of what must a reasonable person perceive as a sufficient show of authority in order to be seized?
Chesternut had been standing on a street corner when he saw a
marked police car with four officers inside the car. 9 When Chesternut began to run, the officers accelerated their car in order to
catch up with him."'0 The officers accelerated at such a rate as to
cover twice the distance of Chesternut in the same amount of
93. Id. at 219. The Court held that,
the presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of detention to these
workers while they walked throughout the factories on job assignments. Likewise, the
mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings
should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they
would be seized or detained in any meaningful way. Since most workers could have
had no reasonable fear that they would be detained upon leaving, we conclude that
the work forces as a whole were not seized.
Id.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
95. The test that the Court formulated in Mendenhall is "whether, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (1980).
96. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502 (1983).
97. Chesternut, 108 S Ct 1975, 1978 (1988).
98. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
99. Chesternut, 108 S Ct at 1977 (1988).
100. Id.
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time. 10 1 Upon overtaking Chesternut, the officers drove parallel to
him, and, in the process, placed him between their vehicle and an
apartment building. 10 2 Both the markings on the side of the car
and the presence of the four officers in the car were plainly visible
to Chesternut.' 0 3 Although the presence of a police car driving
alongside a person may be intimidating, the Supreme Court nevertheless reasoned that it was not sufficient to constitute a seizure. 04
However, a person's belief as to whether or not he was free to leave
is at least partially based on an intimidating encounter with the
police. It is obviously intimidating to have a marked police car
with four officers in it rapidly accelerate and effectively form a
"corridor" thereby effectively confining an individual. The intimidating nature of such an encounter is one of the chief factors which
would lead one to the conclusion that there had been a threatening
show of authority by police officers.
It appears that the United States Supreme Court considers the
intimidation factor to be important in a determination of whether
a person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
The respective facts and the emphasis of the United States Supreme Court of those facts in Mendenha11,105 Royer,106 and Delgado ' 7 focus on whether there was a show of authority by the of101. Brief for Respondent at 15.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Chesternut, 108 S Ct at 1981 (1988).
105. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the United States Supreme Court referred to
Mendenhall's argument that the incident would have appeared coercive to her considering
that she was young (22 years old), and had not graduated from high school and that since
she was a female and a Negro she "may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who
were white males." Id. at 558. The Court stated that although these factors were relevant
they were not decisive due to the fact that the evidence indicated that Mendenhall had
voluntarily consented to accompany the officers.
106. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, two detectives approached Royer and asked to see
his airline ticket and driver's license. Royer produced the requested materials. Upon noticing a discrepancy between the name on the ticket and the name on the driver's license, the
detectives identified themselves as narcotics investigators and asked Royer to accompany
them. The detectives did not return Royer's airline ticket or driver's license. Royer was
placed in a small, windowless room located in a private area of the airport. The detectives
retrieved Royer's luggage without his consent and returned with the luggage to the room. A
search of the luggage was later conducted by the detectives. Id. at 491, 502-03. In determining that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, the plurality of the Court in the opinions of
Justices White, Powell and Brennan found it significant that the detectives did not return
Royer's airline ticket or driver's license. Id. at 503-04, 508, 512. Justice White and Justice
Brennan also found it significant that Royer was removed to a small room to be questioned
and left alone with two police officers. Id. at 502, 508.
107. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In Delgado, INS agents conducted "factory surveys" of the
work force of a garment factory. Agents positioned themselves near factory exits while other
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ficers such that a reasonable person would not have believed he
was free to leave. Writing for the majority in Delgado,'10

8

Justice

Rehnquist wrote that "[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter
are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment." 10 9 Justice Brennan, in writing
the dissenting opinion in Delgado, noted that the testimony of the
respondent employees regarding the "intimidating atmosphere created by the INS's investigative tactics." 110 Justice Brennan would
have held that under the circumstances created by the agents' tactics, a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to
leave and thus "these tactics amounted to seizures of [the employees] under the Fourth Amendment." '' Thus, it is readily apparent
that the intimidation factor is an important, if not crucial, element
in the determination of whether a seizure has occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
It is very likely that Chesternut would have believed that his
freedom of movement was restricted, and that there had been a
threatening show of authority by the officers. When the officers accelerated and placed Chesternut between their car and a building,
the officers effectively created a"corridor" in which he was to run.
Thus Chesternut could either continue to run forward or he could
have reversed direction and run in the direction from where he had
come. He could not run to either side because on the one side he
was blocked by the structure of the building, and on the other side
he was blocked by the police car driving alongside of him. Although Chesternut may have believed that he was seized under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that a reasonable
person would not have believed that his freedom of movement was
being restricted. This conclusion is an unusual interpretation of
what a reasonable person would perceive under these circumstances. The Court decided that the acceleration of the police car
in overtaking Chesternut was not enough to restrict a person's
agents walked about the factory, identified themselves as INS agents and questioned employees as to their citizenship. Id. at 210. During the surveys, the agents carried walkie
talkies and were visibly armed. Id. at 212. As the agents discovered persons suspected of
being illegal aliens, "they would handcuff these persons and lead them away to waiting vans
outside the factory." Id. at 230.
108. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
109. Id. at 216.
110. Id. at 230.
111. Id. at 231.
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freedom of movement. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, as required by the Mendenhall test," 2 one should not only
focus on the acceleration of the police car but also on the fact that
in driving parallel to Chesternut, the officers placed him between
their vehicle and a building. Thus, two possible directions in which
Chesternut might have run were effectively blocked. Moreover, it is
likely that the presence and the actions of the officers under these
circumstances would have been intimidating. Even the Court acknowledged this."' However, they qualified this statement by declaring that an intimidating situation alone is not sufficient to constitute a seizure." 4 But intimidation was not the only factor. The
police had effectively blocked two directions in which Chesternut
might have run. Would a reasonable person have believed under
these circumstances that he was not free to leave? The Supreme
Court said that a reasonable person in these circumstances would
not have perceived that he was seized." 5 If these circumstances do
not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure, then what must a
reasonable person perceive as a show of authority sufficient to constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment?.
Robert J. Hannen

112.
113.
114.
115.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (1980).
Chesternut, 108 S Ct at 1981 (1988).
Id.
Id.

